THE ECOLOGICAL FALLACY REVISITED: AGGREGATE- VERSUS INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL FINDINGS ON ECONOMICS AND ELECTIONS, AND SOCIOTROPIC VOTING*

Gerald H. Kramer

* This work was occasioned by a discussion at the Southern California Political Behavior Seminar. I am indebted to the seminar participants, and also to J. Alt, P. Converse, M. Fiorina, D. Hibbs, N. Kousser, G. Marcos, P. Shively, E. Tufte, and especially to Rod Kieviet for helpful comments and criticisms.
The null hypothesis of self-intereased "macroeconomic factors" vote.

ABSTRACT

Several macroeconomic factors have found to be significant in explaining the vote choice.
The results of the experiments and simulations of the social and political systems show that:

1. The cooperation and coordination of the different levels of the system lead to a more efficient and stable outcome.
2. The interactions between the different levels create feedback loops that influence the behavior of the system.
3. The system's ability to adapt and self-organize is crucial for its survival.

Furthermore, the analysis of the data suggests that:

- The cooperation and coordination between the different levels of the system are essential for its stability.
- The system's ability to adapt and self-organize is crucial for its survival.
- The interactions between the different levels create feedback loops that influence the behavior of the system.

In conclusion, the results of the experiments and simulations indicate the importance of cooperation and coordination between the different levels of the system for its stability and adaptability.
Finally, the analyst's data may also have some hickory.

A number of problems are described below. Level 3 surveys have been conducted, and the results are shown in the figures. The survey design includes the use of statistical models and computer simulations. The data are analyzed to understand the underlying patterns and relationships.

For example, data were collected on the impact of certain variables on the response. The data were then analyzed using statistical techniques such as regression analysis. The results were then compared with other data to assess the validity and reliability of the findings.

The final report includes a comprehensive summary of the findings, along with recommendations for future research. The report is intended to be a valuable resource for policymakers and other stakeholders.

In addition, the report includes a detailed appendix with additional data and supporting materials. The appendix is intended to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the results.
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d.

e.

1. Introduction and Overview

certain different measurements which follow. The proposal concept to be drawn from economic policymakers, and from the policymakers of data and local authorities. This is the problem at hand, and from the concept of the proposal.

With whom concerns of error or bias in the concept of the proposal, there are potential measurement errors. Despite these, or other standards, may turn out to be losses and mistakes. In many cases—in the sample measurement, and so forth. The behavior of indifference, or their measurement in
In the same way that political action can lead to economic change, the \textit{specific action} that will likely result in economic growth is the adoption of policies and actions by the government that affect the performance of the economy. If the government's performance is strong, it is likely that economic growth will follow. Conversely, if the government's performance is weak, it is likely that economic growth will be hindered.

In the context of election, the \textit{specific action} that will likely result in economic change is the \textit{specific voter}. If a voter makes a decision to vote for a candidate, it is likely that the voter's decision will influence the outcome of the election and, ultimately, the government's performance.

In the context of economic change, the \textit{specific action} that will likely result in voter participation is the \textit{specific voter}. If a voter decides to participate in an election, it is likely that the voter's participation will influence the outcome of the election and, ultimately, the government's performance.

In summary, the \textit{specific action} that will likely result in economic growth is the adoption of policies and actions by the government that affect the performance of the economy. The \textit{specific action} that will likely result in economic change is the \textit{specific voter}. The \textit{specific action} that will likely result in voter participation is the \textit{specific voter}. All of these actions are important in influencing the economic performance of the country.
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Section I

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Section II

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\[ T_d + v = 3T_a \int u/v \, d\mu + T_d \int u/v \, d\mu = 3T_a \]

From (1), we have

\[ 3T_a \int u/v \, d\mu = 3T_a \]

If \( a \) is the government-run dummy change in \( u/v \), income over the

\[ \text{aggregate vote for the government-run dummy change in } u/v \text{ income over the } \]

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weighting, etc. in the short run. The time-invariant—time-varying effects. If not, however, 27

We need to consider the time-varying—time-invariant effects for the present assessment. The overall relationship, the slope of the cross-sectional relationship, can be estimated by the

\[ \hat{\beta} = \frac{n \bar{X} \bar{Y} - \sum X \sum Y}{n \bar{X}^2 - \sum X^2} \]

where \( \bar{X} \) is the mean of variable \( X \) and \( \bar{Y} \) is the mean of variable \( Y \).
At an extreme case, if all government expenditures were for permanent government spending, an increase in the level of government spending and not motivated. It is pointed out that the government depends only on the change in per capita income arising from government expenditures and on the variance and correlation between the two. Let us now try to get some of these probable magnitudes.

3. The Government-Data Time-Series Estimate

3.1. An Example

The government-constant variable, an example. This section is to some section of the government-constant component and structural equations, with the government-constant component, our specific motivation is on two factors, and its ability to estimate the estimates only.

\[ \sum \frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x} = \sum \frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x} \]

Let us do the not change in t, the income during period t, effects.

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important factor, particularly in recent times, is macroeconomic policy. 

Considering the government's influence on economic outcomes, macroeconomic policy is crucial for shaping economic conditions. Moreover, the government's interventions can affect the economy in various ways, such as through fiscal and monetary policies.

In managing the economy, the government has the ability to influence economic growth, inflation, and unemployment rates. Fiscal policy, which involves government spending and taxation, can be used to stimulate or slow down the economy. Monetary policy, on the other hand, is conducted by central banks and involves managing interest rates and the money supply.

The government's role in providing social services, ensuring public safety, and regulating markets is also significant. These actions can have long-term effects on economic performance, affecting both the current and future state of the economy.

In conclusion, macroeconomic policy plays a vital role in shaping the economy. By carefully designing and implementing policies, governments can help ensure economic stability and growth, benefitting both current and future generations.
shown in the appendix (Fig. 2) that the cross-sectional regression estimate of 1 + 1 or 3 + 1 across the indutrients. It is also an inbreeding change in 1 + 3, i.e. 1 + 3 or 3 + 1 across the indutrients. We now choose a fixed section of r, and remove the indutrient votes. 4. The Inheritance—Time-Cross Sectional Estimate.

...
\[ 0.75^2 + 0.75^2 = 2.25 = \frac{\psi^2}{\sqrt{\lambda^2 + \psi^2}} \]

Under these assumptions, (with the reversion of change in government income producing a 5 percent shift in votes),

\[ \lambda x + 0.5^2 = \frac{\psi^2}{\sqrt{\lambda^2 + \psi^2}} = s \]

Moreover, the correlation of proportional values in both multiplicative and linear form is

\[ \text{estima} \]

term could then range from -0.5 to +0.5, and this would dominate the

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model variance—the partition

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some weak accidental correlation is exactly how much'

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of course these correlations will not be perfect, so the
government

or other correlated variables, to reduce the effect of the

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components of both multiplicative and linear

in government, to the extent there and other

of course the basic condition, for example, to make things

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opposing the natural log of the component of the variance in government income

the component of the variance in government income

form.

Moreover, the correlation of proportional values in both multiplicative and linear form is

\[ 0.75^2 + 0.75^2 = 2.25 = \frac{\psi^2}{\sqrt{\lambda^2 + \psi^2}} \]
To examine the procedure on social roles voting, we must first consider the process of social roles and how they influence our decisions. When we vote, we are not just casting a ballot; we are also expressing our beliefs and priorities. The way in which we vote can have a significant impact on the outcome of the election.

The voting process is complex and involves many factors. We must consider our personal interests, our social roles, and the role of the government in our lives. The role of the government is to provide services and regulations that benefit the community as a whole. When we vote, we are expressing our opinion on these issues.

Table 1 provides a summary of the key points of this discussion. It highlights the importance of understanding the role of social roles in voting and the impact of these roles on the outcome of elections. The table shows that the role of social roles is significant in shaping the outcome of elections.

In conclusion, the process of social roles voting is complex and involves many factors. We must consider our personal interests, our social roles, and the role of the government in our lives. Understanding these factors will help us make informed decisions at the ballot box.
contradictions, however, but rather in the fact that the same conditions, common to
in the contradictions concerning the role of personal economic
in the contradictions concerning the role of personal economic
The more permanent evidence for sociological voting lies not
to the sociological and self-interested explanation.

The personal voting evidence simply do not demonstrate
something material evidence, with occupational strain compared, in other
condition under another hypothesis: o.p. the social economic work.

Hypothesis (f), so the hypothesis of the selection is nonexistent.

To sum up, the evidence is nonexistent under the self-interested
section. As shown there, under plausible data assumptions the flow
will eventually the positions x remain constant in the decision
P? However, the estimated effect is not necessarily zero, for it
then, as expected, does not depend on the cross-sociological effect.

\[
\frac{\lambda}{S} = \frac{V_{x} \epsilon_{x}}{(V_{x} - F_{x}) \epsilon_{x}} = \frac{\epsilon_{x}}{Q_{x}}
\] (144)

The results are (Appendix, Table 2). This is essentially identical to (144), except
that it now involves the sociological correction of P? In place of the

(\frac{\lambda_{x}}{F_{x} - F_{x}} \epsilon_{x}) \frac{Q_{x}}{Q_{x}}

\[
I \frac{Q_{x}}{Q_{x}}
\] (145)

repeated vote A on X, involving the selection evidence will be
sociologically. At the alliance level, it is an extension of the
two sections could be affected if votes are instability affected

\[
\frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{Q_{x}}{Q_{x}}
\] (146)

In the model, we could model the migration to the
determine the self-interested effects \(11 \) \( Q \), \( (\frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{Q_{x}}{Q_{x}}) \)

In contrast, we observe the self-interested effects \( \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{Q_{x}}{Q_{x}} \)

\[
\gamma Q + \frac{1}{\gamma} Q = \frac{1}{\gamma} Q
\] (147)

formally characterized as follows: a

Contrary to the voting in the model, we observe the coalition
contrast, a social political coalition
can be real income. If we take this as the connotative social
coalition-induced change in income or pol.

\[
\frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{Q_{x}}{Q_{x}}
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in contrast, we observe the connotative of social coalitions improved in

we do not change in inferences of collective mobilization.

One who votes, not to change in inferences of collective mobilization.

Formally characterized as follows: a

Social political coalition
performance (or activity), as noted above, the success in such performance (or activity) depends partly on the interaction of various factors. In the present case, such factors might be political, economic, social, and cultural. The present investigation allows for the examination of the interaction of these factors on the performance (or activity). It is not surprising, therefore, that the overall cross-sectional performance (or activity) is a function of the interaction of these factors. This function is a function of the interaction of the factors, the political, economic, social, and cultural factors, and other related factors. The present investigation allows for the examination of the interaction of these factors on the performance (or activity). It is not surprising, therefore, that the overall cross-sectional performance (or activity) is a function of the interaction of these factors. This function is a function of the interaction of the factors, the political, economic, social, and cultural factors, and other related factors.
A generalized model of the form

\[ g_X + \beta_1 g + \beta_2 g_y + \beta_3 g_z + \text{error} = \beta_0 + \epsilon \]

In the context of a generalized model, suppose we consider

\[ g \] which incorporates both self-interested and self-interested

\[ g_X + \beta_1 g + \beta_2 g_y + \beta_3 g_z + \text{error} = \beta_0 + \epsilon \]

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The recursive equations for the multiple regression of the form

\[ \hat{z} = d'q \]

are given by

\[ \frac{\partial \hat{z}}{\partial \beta} = d'q \]

where \( \beta \) is the vector of regression coefficients. The recursive equations are

\[ (d'X + d'X) \beta = d'q \]

and

\[ (d'X + d'X) \beta = d'q \]

The correlation factor will be the product of the multiple regression of the form

\[ \hat{z} = d'q \]

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essential. Indeed, we already have considerable causal evidence that social influence can lead to self-interested behaviors, and it's possible that such behaviors could be good for the economy and domestic stability. Thus, it's important to examine how the balance of power and influence from import competition, the need for social stability, and the risk of democratic concessions affect the behavior of groups of political structures.

Production, in examining the behavior of the protected, has become a significant issue. The willingness of these groups to sacrifice individual interests for the greater good is central to the functioning of the economy. It's clear that the economic benefits of protection are not evenly distributed, with some groups benefiting more than others.

The protectionist movement argues that self-interested and social influence considerations are essential to maintaining an important lesson, we would be particularly interested in examining the behavior of the protected. In an election in which two candidates vie for office, the two main parties will have a significant impact on the outcome. In this case, the two main parties will provide the candidates with support and resources.

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socorro voting and an essentially empirical and measurable process.

As we have seen, the issues that arise are those associated with uncontrolled and uncounted votes, and this is an example of the effects of technological and technological advancements. In our society, the emphasis on empirical research on the question will be possible.

It is clear from this that the task of manipulating the empirical data to develop an empirical case for the vote are essentially and essentially empirical and measurable processes.

This is important, since the question of what are the effects of the vote is essentially empirical, and measurable. Therefore, the vote is a matter of empirical and measurable processes, which is not.

In the context of the sociological perspective, which is based on a set of assumptions about the nature of society, the vote is a matter of empirical and measurable processes, which is not.

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This is important, since the question of what are the effects of the vote is essentially empirical, and measurable. Therefore, the vote is a matter of empirical and measurable processes, which is not.
TABLE I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>z2</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>120</th>
<th>150</th>
<th>180</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30°</td>
<td>20° + 50°</td>
<td>45°</td>
<td>70°</td>
<td>95°</td>
<td>120°</td>
<td>145°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60°</td>
<td>40° + 50°</td>
<td>65°</td>
<td>90°</td>
<td>115°</td>
<td>140°</td>
<td>165°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90°</td>
<td>60° + 50°</td>
<td>85°</td>
<td>110°</td>
<td>135°</td>
<td>160°</td>
<td>185°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120°</td>
<td>80° + 50°</td>
<td>105°</td>
<td>130°</td>
<td>155°</td>
<td>180°</td>
<td>205°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150°</td>
<td>100° + 50°</td>
<td>125°</td>
<td>150°</td>
<td>175°</td>
<td>200°</td>
<td>225°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180°</td>
<td>120° + 50°</td>
<td>145°</td>
<td>170°</td>
<td>195°</td>
<td>220°</td>
<td>245°</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All values are in a 45° x 45° area. The accuracy of the values is ± 0.05 degrees.

VARY(00) AND VARY(11) ARE POINTS AT WHICH THE VARYANCES ARE 0.25 OF THE VARYANCES AT 45°.

PRELIMINARY CROSS-SECTIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE FUNCTION OF

VAR(00) AND VARY(00) ARE POINTS AT WHICH THE VARYANCES ARE 0.25 OF THE VARYANCES AT 45°.
REFERENCES
In the context of a more realistic material, essential. All of our points could be made, though in more

This procedure, formulation of one nation, to simplify and in not

would also apply to this problem of representation

a bit more complicated, but all of the main points made above

to more complicated and non-linear models, would make the representation

be below some threshold value. In this case, the constraint would

or otherwise the incremental according to whether, if

appropriate for the index in a product estimation voter t with the

involves, I vote as a determined variable, then, you cannot

ecological conditions.

each other by any direct behavioral response by voters to

is actually produced by those different campaign offices.

never election between economic conditions and electoral outcomes

look at formidable economically. They are the two three

terms from their party, or to rotate from the field is things

partisan decisions effective campaign offices when they think economically

and party leaders' policy and how, and the people's economic

vote, due to their primary, economic conditions, political

points, and other economic conditions, economic conditions, political

4. Johnson and Roosevelt (1913), compared to evidence that whole

different conditions, which are, however, probably also many

different conditions, which are, however, probably also many

in addition, each condition, one of which and all of

6. This point is made in an article, one of which and all of


before the social

then there were no free

politics and campaign strategies could not compete in persistent

low turnout, however, if the estimated correctly to support that

REFERENCES

45
In the year 1973, the number is remarkably low, especially when one takes into account the significant increase in GNP which was expected to correlate to the presidential U.S. election.

In order of magnitude, these results and policy questions on the presidential election in this year and other policy variables on this $20 billion over a one-year period, or more than a percent, percent of the Federal budget would have saved could be substantial.

In government planning of goods and services (appropriately), it is clear that in Table 2.10 show that in 1971, a decade of $5 trillion to the interpretation of the data shown in Table 1. The results are shown in Table 1 and some correlation with the model in Table 1.10 show that the correlation is not substantial with a macroeconomic model. I have not attempted to simulate this model with a macroeconomic model. I have not attempted to simulate this model with a macroeconomic model. I have not attempted to simulate this model with a macroeconomic model. I have not attempted to simulate this model with a macroeconomic model. I have not attempted to simulate this model with a macroeconomic model.
\[
\text{Summary of the Analysis for a Fixed Election and Voting Across Groups:}
\]

For a fixed election and voting across groups, the total change in government-induced, the aggregate of across government-induced, and the mean of across the I elections, the aggregate vote for the same-vote voters, the aggregate vote for the same-vote voters, and the aggregate vote for the same-vote voters, we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{the aggregate across } & = \frac{3}{t} \\
\text{the mean of across } & = \frac{3}{t} \\
\text{the aggregate vote for the same-vote voters } & = \frac{3}{t} \\
\text{the aggregate vote for the same-vote voters } & = \frac{3}{t} \\
\text{the aggregate vote for the same-vote voters } & = \frac{3}{t} \\
\text{the aggregate vote for the same-vote voters } & = \frac{3}{t} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Some Basic Identities and Definitions

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{between government-induced economic factors and } I, & = \frac{3}{t} I \\
\text{the change, deterministically, the total change in } I & = \frac{3}{t} I \\
\text{the change in } I, & = \frac{3}{t} I \\
\text{the change in } P & = \frac{3}{t} P \\
\text{the change in } I & = \frac{3}{t} I \\
\text{the change in } P & = \frac{3}{t} P \\
\end{align*}
\]

\section*{Appendix}

\section*{Findings on Economics and Elections, and Socioeconomic Voting}

\section*{The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate versus Individual-Level
\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( x_i - \bar{x} \right)^2}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( x_i - \bar{x} \right) (y_i - \bar{y})} & = \text{R}^2 \\
\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( x_i - \bar{x} \right) (y_i - \bar{y})}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( x_i - \bar{x} \right)^2} & = \text{R}^2
\end{align*}
\]

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\end{align*}
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\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( x_i - \bar{x} \right) (y_i - \bar{y})}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( x_i - \bar{x} \right)^2} & = \text{R}^2
\end{align*}
\]
\[
\frac{\sum (x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y})}{\sum (x_i - \bar{x})^2} = r
\]

The expression for the correlation coefficient, the coefficient of determination, is:

\[
r = \frac{\sum (x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum (x_i - \bar{x})^2 \sum (y_i - \bar{y})^2}}
\]

Assuming the mean of the variables is zero, we have:

\[
\sum x_i = \sum y_i = 0
\]

So, the correlation coefficient becomes:

\[
r = \frac{\sum x_i y_i}{\sqrt{\sum x_i^2 \sum y_i^2}}
\]

where \(x\) and \(y\) are the variables.

Similarly, the correlation coefficient for \(x'\) and \(y'\) is:

\[
r' = \frac{\sum x'_i y'_i}{\sqrt{\sum x'_i^2 \sum y'_i^2}}
\]

The correlation coefficient between \(x\) and \(y\) is:

\[
r = \frac{\sum (x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum (x_i - \bar{x})^2 \sum (y_i - \bar{y})^2}}
\]

where \(\bar{x}\) and \(\bar{y}\) are the means of \(x\) and \(y\), respectively.

The correlation coefficient between \(x'\) and \(y'\) is:

\[
r' = \frac{\sum (x'_i - \bar{x}')(y'_i - \bar{y}')}{\sqrt{\sum (x'_i - \bar{x}')^2 \sum (y'_i - \bar{y}')^2}}
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\]

where \(\bar{x}'\) and \(\bar{y}'\) are the means of \(x'\) and \(y'\), respectively.
For a self-interested voter (again denoting by $d$ the "self-interest" 

\[
\frac{(3^1\xi)_{CS}^{\text{VOTE}}}{(3^1\xi)_{CS}^{\text{GOV}}} = \frac{(3^1\xi)_{CS}^{\text{VOTE}}}{(3^1\xi)_{CS}^{\text{GOV}}} = d
\]

(33)

cross-sectional correlation coefficient is then

In a simple illustrative representation of voter on performance ratings, the

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} d_i = \bar{d}
\]

(34)

General, in the context of the current work, the correlation between the economy in
administration (or overall performance) in judging the economy in the
performance ratings.

\[ \frac{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{VOTE}}}{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{GOV}}} = \bar{d} \]

(38)

where \( d \) is now the "self-interested voter" of the economy.

(39)

Notice that correlation, we can write

More generally, if voters respond to both personal and

\[ \frac{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{VOTE}}}{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{GOV}}} = \bar{d} \]

(40)

**This is important to notice:**

\[ \frac{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{VOTE}}}{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{GOV}}} = \bar{d} \]

(42)

while the cross-sectional correlation (38) becomes

\[ \frac{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{VOTE}}}{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{GOV}}} = \bar{d} \]

(41)

\[ \frac{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{VOTE}}}{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{GOV}}} = \bar{d} \]

(31)

which is important in (18). In the cross-sectional correlation

\[ \frac{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{VOTE}}}{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{GOV}}} = \bar{d} \]

(27)

\[ \frac{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{VOTE}}}{(3^1\alpha)_{CS}^{\text{GOV}}} = \bar{d} \]

(26)
Regression, the normal equations for this regression can be written as

\[ \mathbf{X}'\mathbf{d} - \mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q} = \mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q} \]  

(9)

Similarly, (37) can be rewritten as

\[ \mathbf{X}'\mathbf{d} - \mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q} = \mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q} \]  

(38)

Solving for \( \mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q} \) and \( \mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q} \), we have

\[ \mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q} = (\mathbf{d}'\mathbf{A}'\mathbf{A} + \mathbf{d}'\mathbf{A}'\mathbf{A}) \mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q} = (\mathbf{d}'\mathbf{A}'\mathbf{A}) \mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q} \]  

(39)

In the general case (39) of both personal and sectoral

\[ \frac{(\mathbf{d}'\mathbf{d})_{\mathbf{CS}}}{(\mathbf{d}'\mathbf{d})_{\mathbf{Q}}} = \frac{(\mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q})_{\mathbf{CS}}}{\mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q}} \]  

(40)

On the other hand, for a "sectoral" vector, we have simply

\[ \frac{(\mathbf{d}'\mathbf{d})_{\mathbf{CS}}}{(\mathbf{d}'\mathbf{d})_{\mathbf{Q}}} + \frac{(\mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q})_{\mathbf{CS}}}{(\mathbf{d}'\mathbf{q})_{\mathbf{Q}}} = I_d \]  

(41)

Parameter \( p \) of (22) then becomes